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Abstract: In this paper, I describe a category of political values that I call 
“institutional values.”  An institutional value (the quintessential examples 
of which are democracy and the rule of law) is distinct from an ordinary 
(or “abstract”) political value like justice by having both descriptive and 
evaluative components.  I defend a method of sorting out correct from 
incorrect conceptions of an institutional value that relies on two ideas: 
coherence and verisimilitude.
The Concept of an Institutional Value
There is a puzzling difference between political values like justice and 
those like democracy.  Both are evaluative terms: to say that a state is do-
ing something unjust or undemocratic is to criticize that state.  Yet they 
serve very different argumentative functions.  It’s possible to reject de-
mocracy in toto; no such possibility seems to be at hand for justice.  Con-
sequently, democracy requires a defense, and has had respectable critics 
from Plato onward.  To demand that someone defend the value of justice 
just sounds like a category mistake: how could we defend justice?  That 
would be like defending goodness, or virtue.  These are the ideas by which 
we defend other things.1
Another difference between justice and democracy is that democracy 
has a much narrower range of practical extensions.  Justice can mean cor-
rective justice, distributive justice, procedural justice, ad nauseum, and 
can entail, on one’s preferred conception, anything from Rawls’s two prin-
ciples to the punishment of wrongdoers to Nozick’s avoidance of rights-
violating transactions to Plato’s appropriate arrangement of the parts of 
soul and state.  At most, these ideas seem to bear a family resemblance to 
one another.  By contrast, there are many conceptions of democracy, but 
all have something to do with making government accountable to ordinary 
FLWL]HQVHQVXULQJWKDWWKRVHZLWKQRQRI¿FLDOYLHZVJHWWREHKHDUGDQG
some kind of will or opinion-aggregating mechanism like voting or delib-
eration.
Perhaps we could describe the concept of justice in its most abstract 
form as ‘giving to each what he or she ought to have.’  But that description 
could cover all of political morality (including democracy: “people ought 
to have a say”).  By contrast, were I to take a pass at uttering the concept 
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of democracy under which all these conceptions are offered, it would be 
VRPHWKLQJ OLNH ³UXOHE\ WKHSHRSOH´ WKLV LVQRQVSHFL¿F LQGHHGEXWQRW
nearly so much so as the abstract concept of justice.  “Democracy” simply 
means something more precise than does “justice.”
The relationship between democracy and the particular practices that 
come under its head is at best unclear.  Consider three positions.  First, we 
might think that even if democracy is extensionally equivalent to things 
like majoritarianism, it is intensionally distinct.  In support of this position, 
ZHPD\VXSSRVHWKDWVRPHRQHDUJXHVWKDWWKHHOHFWLRQRISXEOLFRI¿FLDOV
by majority vote is normatively valuable: we would (I take it) understand 
that value only at a remove: it would be valuable in virtue of its contri-
bution to satisfying the demands generated by the higher-order value of 
democracy.  It would be implausible to argue that majority election of 
RI¿FLDOVLVYDOXDEOHLQDQGRILWVHOI%\FRQWUDVWZHRUGLQDULO\WKLQNWKDW
democracy is valuable for its own sake.  On this position, to say that some 
practice is required by democracy is not to say that it is identical with 
democracy.
Second, we might think that democracy is just identical to the practic-
es that we describe using the term.  In favor of this position one could offer 
the mirror image of the considerations in favor of the previous position. 
Consider a dictator, who claims that his one-person rule is consistent with 
democracy.  We wouldn’t say that our dictator is merely making a moral 
error, misapplying the abstract normative concept of democracy.  In addi-
tion, he’s misusing the word, making the kind of error that no competent 
user of the language could make in good faith.  To see this, note that we 
wouldn’t even bother to offer an argument against his claims.  We’d, I take 
LWVLPSO\GLVPLVVWKHPDVQRQVHQVH%\FRQWUDVWVRPHRQHZKRFODLPHG
that justice required, say, stealing from the poor and giving to the rich need 
only be making a moral error, not the same kind of conceptual blunder.)
7KHGHIHQGHURIWKHVHFRQGSRVLWLRQKRZHYHUZRXOGKDYHWR¿JXUH
out what to do with the old problem of getting an “ought” from an “is.”  If 
democracy just describes empirical social practices, where does the value 
come from?
These considerations suggest taking the third position: democracy, 
unlike justice, has both descriptive and evaluative components.  In this 
it bears a resemblance to a “thick ethical concept,” but transposed to the 
political domain.2  It occupies an intermediate position between abstract 
evaluative ideas like justice and concrete behaviors (what I will call brute 
descriptive factsZLWKQR¿UVWRUGHUQRUPDWLYHYDOXHOLNHPDMRULW\HOHF
WLRQRIRI¿FLDOV
If we accept that proposition, the thickness of a value like democracy 
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can explain its disputability.  All descriptive facts (or counterfactual de-
scriptive facts) about political communities are in principle open to criti-
cism: it’s possible to deny that government ought to be accountable to 
RUGLQDU\FLWL]HQVRUWKDWWKRVHZLWKQRQRI¿FLDOYLHZVRXJKWWREHKHDUG
Doing so necessarily commits one to rejecting democracy.  By contrast, 
it’s possible to criticize any descriptive fact about a political communi-
ty without criticizing justice itself: if one denies, for example, that there 
ought to be a tax and transfer system of economic redistribution, or that 
criminals ought to be punished, these denials do not commit one to deny-
ing the value of justice.  They simply commit one to the proposition that 
tax-and-transfer or punishment do not form part of the correct conception 
of what justice is.  Justice is immune from criticism in a way that democ-
racy is not because justice is a moving target, while democracy is tied 
down to particular social institutions.
Accordingly, I propose to call democracy, and other political values 
that are both descriptive and evaluative, institutional values.  After de-
mocracy, the institutional value that immediately suggests itself is the rule 
of law.3  Accepting the rule of law ordinarily commits one to accepting a 
relatively determinate set of practical extensions such as the absence of 
secret laws, giving accused criminals an opportunity to put up a defense 
EHIRUHSXQLVKLQJWKHPIRUELGGLQJVWDWHRI¿FLDOVIURPXVLQJWKHLUSRZHUV
unless authorized by law, etc.  Unsurprisingly, the rule of law, too, has its 
respectable philosophical critics, primarily among the left.4  By contrast, 
other familiar political values like liberty and equality are more like jus-
tice, and could be called abstract values to indicate their lack of a descrip-
tive component.5
I also submit that institutional values have defeasible value.  Here, I do 
not mean that they offer only pro tanto reasons—a property at least argu-
ably shared by thick ethical concepts,6 and indeed by more abstract values 
in both the moral and political domains—rather, I mean the point noted 
earlier, that our endorsement of the institutional value itself is merely a 
default position, subject to reexamination and dispute.  Like justice, but 
XQOLNHWKHPDMRULW\HOHFWLRQRIRI¿FLDOVLQRUGLQDU\ODQJXDJHLQVWLWXWLRQDO
YDOXHVIXQFWLRQDV¿UVWRUGHUHYDOXDWLYHWHUPV+RZHYHUOLNHWKHPDMRULW\
HOHFWLRQRIRI¿FLDOVEXWXQOLNHMXVWLFH LW LVSRVVLEOH LQRUGLQDU\SUDFWLFH
to demand and offer the defense of an institutional in terms of some other 
value.  Rousseau, for example, defends democracy in virtue of its ability 
to preserve freedom in a civil society.  This defeasibility or disputability 
property can be captured in the notion that ordinary language assumes that 
institutional values are in fact valuable, but that the invoker of an institu-
tional value is obliged to defend it on demand.
238
Paul Gowder
The following chart summarizes the properties elucidated thus far:
Abstract Value Institutional Value Brute Descriptive 
  Fact
Only Evaluative Evaluative and Only Descriptive
 Descriptive
Yes Yes No
No Yes Yes
Justice, Liberty, Democracy, the Majority Rule, the 
Equality, Welfare Rule of Law Jury Trial
Evaluative content?
First-Order
Normative Value?
Requires Defense?
Examples
 7KH'LI¿FXOW\RI6D\LQJ:KDWDQ,QVWLWXWLRQDO9DOXH,V
To say that an institutional value is partly descriptive is not to say that it is 
easy to reach a consensus about its content.  Both democracy and the rule 
of law have been subject to intense controversy not only about their value 
but also about what, precisely, the terms actually mean.  
Accurately describing an institutional value in any detail is intrinsi-
cally more complex than accurately describing an abstract value, because 
an account of an institutional value can be mistaken on its descriptive side 
as well as its evaluative side.  That is, it is possible to criticize an account 
of an institutional value either for not actually being valuable, or for not 
matching our understanding about the practical institutions that the value 
is meant to track.
Because institutional values are always subject to the demand for a 
GHIHQVHLQWHUPVRIVRPHRWKHU¿UVWRUGHUYDOXHDQRWKHUZD\WRJHWDQDF
count of an institutional value wrong is to introduce inconsistencies in the 
PDWFKEHWZHHQLWVLQVWLWXWLRQDOVLGHDQGWKH¿UVWRUGHUYDOXHVLW¶VVXSSRVHG
to serve.  For example, someone who stands with Rousseau and thinks that 
democracy is valuable in virtue of its relationship to freedom might object 
to a particular conception of what democracy requires on the grounds that 
LWVHUYHVVRPHRWKHU¿UVWRUGHUYDOXHZHOIDUHVD\EXWQRWIUHHGRP7KLV
is exactly how we can understand the standard “majority tyranny” critique 
RIPDMRULWDULDQGHPRFUDF\²DV WKHFODLPWKDWPDMRULW\UXOHFDQ¶WEH WKH
right description of the institutional/descriptive side of democracy if indi-
vidual freedom is the normative/evaluative side.
In sum, any given conception of an institutional value can fail as a 
description of the underlying concept by not being valuable, by not being 
valuable for the reasons that the underlying concept is valuable, or by fail-
LQJWRWUDFNWKHFRQFHSW¶VSUDFWLFDOH[WHQVLRQV
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The Coherence Criterion
,QRUGHUWRDYRLGWKHVHGLI¿FXOWLHVFRKHUHQFHVXJJHVWVLWVHOIDVDQDWXUDO
HYDOXDWLYHFULWHULRQIRUDQDFFRXQWRIDQ LQVWLWXWLRQDOYDOXH :HVKRXOG
GHVFULEH WKH HYDOXDWLYH DQG GHVFULSWLYH VLGHV RI DQ\ JLYHQ LQVWLWXWLRQDO
YDOXHWRJHWKHUE\VWDWLQJERWKWKHSUDFWLFDOH[WHQVLRQVDWWULEXWHGWRWKDW
YDOXHDQGLWVQRUPDWLYHGHIHQVHLQWHUPVRIVRPHRWKHU¿UVWRUGHUYDOXHRU
YDOXHV:HFDQMXGJHVXFKDQDFFRXQWVDWLVIDFWRU\DWWKH¿UVWSDVVLIWKH
QRUPDWLYHGHIHQVHVWDWHV WKHYDOXHV WKDWEHVW MXVWLI\ WKHSUDFWLFDOH[WHQ
VLRQVDQGWKHSUDFWLFDOH[WHQVLRQVEHVWIXO¿OOWKHYDOXHVHOXFLGDWHGLQWKH
FRXUVHRIWKHQRUPDWLYHGHIHQVH
7R FRQWLQXH ZLWK WKH UXQQLQJ H[DPSOH 5RXVVHDX¶V DFFRXQW RI GH
PRFUDF\FDQEHWHVWHGDJDLQVWWKHFRKHUHQFHFULWHULRQDVIROORZV )LUVW
PDNH H[SOLFLW WKH HYDOXDWLYH DQG GHVFULSWLYH VLGHV RI WKH DFFRXQW 7KH
HYDOXDWLYHVLGHJRHVVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKLVGHPRFUDF\LVYDOXDEOHEHFDXVH
LWSHUPLWVDOOFLWL]HQVWREHIUHHLQWKHVHQVHRIRQO\EHLQJUXOHGE\WKHP
VHOYHVfreedom-as-self-rule7KHGHVFULSWLYHVLGHLVDVSHFL¿FDWLRQRIWKH
SUDFWLFHVWKDWGHPRFUDF\UHTXLUHVDXQLYHUVDODJUHHPHQWWRHQWHULQWRWKH
VWDWHFLWL]HQVWKDWFRQVLGHUWKHFRPPRQJRRGDQGYRWHRQWKHODZVDQGVR
IRUWKgeneral-will-society 7KHDFFRXQWSDVVHV WKHFRKHUHQFHFULWHULRQ
LI IUHHGRPDVVHOIUXOH EHVW MXVWL¿HV WKH JHQHUDOZLOOVRFLHW\ DQG LI WKH
JHQHUDOZLOOVRFLHW\LVWKHEHVWZD\WRIXO¿OOIUHHGRPDVVHOIUXOH
&RKHUHQFHFDQQRWVHUYHDVWKHORQHHYDOXDWLYHFULWHULRQEHFDXVHWKHUH
PD\EHPXOWLSOHPXWXDOO\H[FOXVLYHFRKHUHQWDFFRXQWVRIDQLQVWLWXWLRQDO
YDOXH)RUH[DPSOHVRPHRQHHOVHPLJKWRIIHUDQDFFRXQWRIGHPRFUDF\
LQZKLFKLWVQRUPDWLYHYDOXHFRQVLVWVLQPD[LPL]LQJDJJUHJDWHSUHIHUHQFH
VDWLVIDFWLRQDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\DQLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHVFULSWLRQLQZKLFKFLWL
]HQVFRQVLGHUQRWWKHFRPPRQJRRGEXWWKHLUSULYDWHGHVLUHVLQFDVWLQJ
WKHLUYRWHV%RWKDFFRXQWVFRXOGVDWLVI\WKHFRKHUHQFHFULWHULRQ
 Verisimilitude and Ostension
,RIIHUYHULVLPLOLWXGHDVDVHFRQGFULWHULRQ7KHGHVFULSWLYHFRPSRQHQWRI
DQLQVWLWXWLRQDOYDOXHVHHPVWREHURRWHGLQSDUWLQRXUH[SHULHQFHVRIUHDO
ZRUOGVRFLHWLHVWKDWH[HPSOLI\WKDWYDOXH7RVHHWKLVFRQVLGHUWKDWDQDF
FRXQWRIGHPRFUDF\WKDWFRPPLWVWKRVHZKRHQGRUVHLWWRODEHOLQJancien 
UpJLPH)UDQFHDVDGHPRFUDF\ZRXOGEHREMHFWLRQDEOHRQWKRVHJURXQGV
FRKHUHQWRURWKHUZLVH7
:HFDQXVHWKHYHULVLPLOLWXGHFULWHULRQWRUHFRQVLGHUWKHVRUWLWLRQH[
DPSOH $QFLHQW$WKHQV XVHG VRUWLWLRQ DQG$WKHQVZDV D GHPRFUDF\ LI
DQ\WKLQJZDV'HQ\LQJWKDWVRUWLWLRQLQSHUPLVVLEOHLQGHPRFUDFLHVVHHPV
WRFRPPLWRQHWRGHQ\LQJWKDW$WKHQVZDVDGHPRFUDF\7KLVZRXOGFRXQW
LQIDYRURILQFOXGLQJORWWHULHVLQDFRQFHSWLRQRIGHPRFUDF\RUDWOHDVWGH
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nying that societies that use lotteries are undemocratic on those grounds.
The inclusion of verisimilitude as an evaluative criterion for an ac-
count of an institutional value may give rise to the following worry.  One 
function of a political value is to provide critical traction on real-world 
societies thought to exemplify that value, albeit imperfectly.  It is because 
we see the United States as a democracy that we can criticize things like 
WKHHOHFWRUDOFROOHJHRUWKHLQÀXHQFHRIPRQH\LQSROLWLFVDVIDOOLQJVKRUW
of that ideal.
But if a correct account of the descriptive part of a given institutional 
value V necessarily corresponds to those real-world societies that typi-
cally are described as V-societies, V may no longer be able to serve this 
IXQFWLRQ7KDWLVLIZHGH¿QHZKDWDGHPRFUDF\LVLQWHUPVRIWKHLQVWLWX
tions of (say) classical Athens, it looks like we have disabled ourselves by 
GH¿QLWLRQDO¿DWIURPEHLQJDEOHWRVD\WKDWFODVVLFDO$WKHQVIHOOVKRUWRI
democracy in some respects (e.g., the exclusion of women from the elec-
torate, or its possession of slavery).
To avoid this problem, I borrow from Ronald Dworkin’s interpretive 
DSSURDFKWRODZ2Q'ZRUNLQ¶VDSSURDFKWR¿JXUHRXWZKDWWKHODZLVRQ
a given question, one must start with the existing legal material (judicial 
opinions, codes, etc.), and come to some conclusion about the normative 
values that best justify that material.  From those values, it is possible to 
generate an internal critique of the legal material—a critique of the legal 
material derived from the very values that justify it.  One might argue, for 
example, that the existing judicial opinions comprising the body of prop-
HUW\ODZDUHFROOHFWLYHO\MXVWL¿HGE\WKHLGHDWKDWWKHSXUSRVHRISURSHUW\
is to secure individual autonomy by delineating the scope of each person’s 
protected sphere of choice.  Doing so does not rule out the subsequent 
argument that the rules given by those cases only do so imperfectly, and 
WKDWVRPHPRGL¿FDWLRQWRWKHUXOHRWKHUZLVHJLYHQE\WKHERG\RIRSLQLRQV
would better secure individual autonomy.8
This gives the following procedure for offering an account of an insti-
tutional value.  
First, elucidate its descriptive component as a functional generaliza-
tion of the practices of real-world societies thought to exemplify that val-
ue.9'RQHFRUUHFWO\WKLVVDWLV¿HVWKHYHULVLPLOLWXGHFULWHULRQ
Second, develop the best case for why the given descriptive properties 
PLJKWEHQRUPDWLYHO\YDOXDEOH LQ WHUPVRIVRPH¿UVWRUGHUYDOXHRWKHU
than the institutional value under consideration.
Third, extend the account given in step two and ask whether there are 
alternative social practices that better satisfy the values given, whether or 
not they exist in real societies.  
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The account will then consist in the values given in step two, the prac-
tices given in steps one and three, and the argument that, together, they 
satisfy the coherence criterion.  If the practices given in step three do not 
match the practices in the real world given in step one, this licenses the 
conclusion that the real world states under examination are potentially 
subject to criticism from the standpoint of the institutional value.
If no plausible argument can be given in step two, this licenses one of 
two possible conclusions.  First, we might conclude that the institutional 
YDOXH UHDOO\ LV QR YDOXH DW DOO²HJ WKDWZH FDQ¶W ¿QG DQ\WKLQJZRUWK
having in existing democracies, so democracy actually is valueless.  Al-
ternatively, we might conclude that no real-world society instantiates the 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOYDOXHWRDVXI¿FLHQWH[WHQWWKDWZHFDQREVHUYHLWVGHVFULSWLYH
side—e.g., that there has never been a democracy, though we might still 
imagine a counterfactual democracy that would be valuable.10
Notes
1 One can, of course, deny the existence of justice, but even a skeptic about 
justice cannot deny that, were justice to exist, it would be a good thing to have.
2 One distinction between values like democracy and ordinary thick ethical 
concepts is that, as noted, a value like democracy can be controversial; a thick eth-
ical concept (like courage) ordinarily is not—or, at least, not to the same extent. 
Someone might conceivably deny that courage is valuable, but nobody would say 
it’s actually wicked; people have made such claims against democracy.
3 ,¿UVWSURSRVHGWKHLGHDRIDQLQVWLWXWLRQDOYDOXHLQDSDSHURQWKHUXOHRI
law (Gowder, 2013).
4 I respond to the left-critique of the rule of law in Gowder (forthcoming 
2014).
5 +HUH ,PD\ EH DUWL¿FLDOO\ GLYLGLQJ D FRQWLQXXP LQWR GLVFUHWH VSDFH LW
might be that equality and liberty are more concrete and more potentially ob-
jectionable than justice, but less concrete and less potentially objectionable than 
GHPRFUDF\1RWKLQJRILPSRUWDQFHLVORVWE\WKHVLPSOL¿FDWLRQ
6 Cf. Moore (2006), who suggests that the reasons given by thick ethical 
concepts are defeasible by reasons given by other values.
7 This feature is shared with thick ethical concepts.  An account of courage 
is objectionable if it does not license us to say that Leonidas displayed courage by 
VWDQGLQJDJDLQVWWKH3HUVLDQDUP\DQGWKDW3DULVGLVSOD\HGFRZDUGLFHE\ÀHHLQJ
from Menelaus.
8 Interestingly, law itself seems to share the main features of an institutional 
value.  At least on the dominant positivist account, law is both descriptive (i.e., is 
GH¿QHGLQWHUPVRIREVHUYHGVRFLDOIDFWVDVZHOODVQRUPDWLYHLHLVXQGHUVWRRG
as obligation-generating, at least by those who take what Hart called the internal 
point of view on a legal system).  I cannot investigate this speculation here, but it 
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may be that the sort of normative ought that institutional values generate is similar 
in some meaningful respect to the sort of ought that positive laws generate.
9 In the case of democracy, this would require asking what, e.g., classical 
Athens, the U.K., the U.S., and other quintessential democracies have in common. 
Although each has very different institutions (the mass assembly, the sovereign 
parliament, the divided and federal government), all seem to serve similar func-
tions associated with democracy, like making the state accountable to the masses.
10 I thank Chris Hom for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, 
and Jim Swindler for truly excellent comments at the conference.  Incidentally, 
-LP¶VODVWUHPDUNVLQKLVFRPPHQWDU\KDYHOHGPHWRUHFRQVLGHUWKH¿QDOUHPDUN
in my text: perhaps, in a world which has never had a democracy, we could not 
imagine a counterfactual democracy—the value in an institutional value may only 
be observable in conjunction with lived experience.
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